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I. Introduction
Women have struggled with employment for centuries. In
many nations and for many years, it has been considered
undesirable for women to work outside the home. During periods
when families were more likely to be engaged in family-run
enterprises such as farming, women working within these
enterprises did not pose a problem. However, as agrarian lifestyles
have declined and industrialization and poverty have increased,
even traditional families have found it necessary to have their
women work outside the home in order to supplement the family's
income.
Great strides toward equality in employment have made it
more common to see women in the paid labor force working side-
by-side with men. Women in the workforce are still plagued by
traditional ideas about the role of women in society. As a result,
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many women are not treated as equal to their male counterparts,
even in the world's most developed nations. In the developed
world, this inequality may manifest itself as differences in pay for
similar work performed by men and women. In some developing
nations, the inequalities may result not only in pay differentials,
but also in severe physical and emotional mistreatment as well as
unfair and unlawful termination practices that frequently go
unpunished.
This piece explores the role of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and other international organizations in
curbing such practices and the efficacy of those attempts to
promote equality in the global workforce. Several directives
promulgated by the ILO will be considered, including the
Maternity Protection Conventions, the Discrimination (Employment
and Occupation) Conventions, and the Workers with Family
Responsibilities Conventions. The effectiveness of the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women will also be discussed. The piece will particularly focus
on the three Central American countries of Guatemala, Mexico,
and El Salvador.
II. The International Labor Organization
A. History of the International Labor Organization
Humanitarian, political, and economic concerns motivated the
creation of the ILO in 1919.1 Politically, there was concern that if
the numbers of workers under these conditions increased, the
inevitable result would be social unrest. 2  There was also an
economic interest in leveling the playing field between employers
and countries attempting to promote these goals and those who
were not.3
The 1LO is a special agency of the United Nations,4 but the
1 International Labour Organization [ILO], ILO History, http://www.ilo.org/public
/english/about/history.htm ("The condition of workers, more and more numerous and
exploited with no consideration for their health, their family lives and their advancement,
was less and less acceptable.").
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 ILO, About the ILO, http://www.ilo.org/public/English/about/index.htm.
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organization has its own constitution and governing body. 5  The
organization's role is to
formulate international labor standards in the form of
Conventions and Recommendations setting minimum standards
of basic labour rights: freedom of association, the right to
organize, collective bargaining, abolition of forced labour,
equality of opportunity and treatment, and other standards
regulating conditions across the entire spectrum of work related
issues.6
When the ILO proposes a Convention or Recommendation,
member states can sign on and agree to be bound by its terms, or
may opt out of certain provisions.7 Another important deficiency
is that even if a signing member breaches the terms of the
Convention, the ILO-like its parent, the United Nations-lacks
effective enforcement mechanisms. In many cases, one of the
only effective ways of ensuring the compliance of particular
countries is to incorporate international mandates into their
domestic laws.8 However, this only helps if the country enforces
such domestic laws. In the absence of such domestic laws, the
only deterrent effect comes from negative publicity a country may
receive as a result of breaching the international mandates. Some
scholars posit that the ILO is becoming increasingly irrelevant in
certain parts of the world; this sentiment does nothing to improve
adherence to the organization's mandates.9
5 Id. ("Within the UN system, the ILO has a unique tripartite structure with
workers and employers participating as equal partners with governments in the work of
its governing organs.")
6 Id.
7 ILO, Who We Are: ILO Constitution, art. 19 §§ 5(e), 6(e), http://www.ilo.org
/public/english/about/iloconst.htm [hereinafter ILO Constitution].
8 In fact, the organization's constitution mandates that signing countries attempt
this. Id. art. 19, § 5(b).
9 THE ILO AND THE SOCIAL CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY: THE GENEVA
LECTURES 61 (Roger Blanpain & Christ Engels eds., 2001).
[Iln Europe the international organization which has the most domestic impact
is the European Union and no business can afford to ignore developments there.
Nevertheless, the impact of an organization such as the ILO remains largely
ignored by the wider business community. At a time when the ILO is in danger
of becoming [ir]relevant, this is not a satisfactory state of affairs.
Id. Other scholars note that "the 1LO is harming its credibility by continuing to adopt
Conventions that are increasingly less ratified." Id. at 63.
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B. Procedures of the ILO
Some posit that the ILO has one of the most sophisticated
supervisory systems when compared to other international
organizations. 10 It certainly has the most elaborate supervisory
system of labor law organizations.'" The system incorporates two
procedures: reporting procedures and complaint procedures.
The reporting ones are based on the Constitution of the
Organization. [Article] 22 of the Constitution obliges Member
States to report regularly on measures that have been taken by
them to give effect to conventions the States concerned have
ratified. 'Regularly' originally meant yearly. In view of the
number of Conventions that have been drawn up and
consequently the greater number of ratifications over the years,
the reporting intervals have been changed.12
As a result of this increase, the reporting interval has risen to
once every four years. 13 The reporting obligation, however, does
not rest only with countries that have ratified a pertinent
Convention. Those member states who have not ratified a
particular Convention are to supply information about "position of
their law and practice in regard to matters dealt with in the specific
Conventions as well as on the difficulties preventing or delaying
the ratification of such Convention."'
' 4
Reporting requirements accomplish different goals, depending
on whether a country has ratified a Convention. 5 For ratifying
countries, reporting is supposed to provide a means of supervision
regardless of whether the reporting state complies with its
obligations as a ratifier. 16 For non-ratifying countries, the goal is
for the member to show the position of its law and practices on
issues covered by the convention, and to give the member an
opportunity to explain why it has not yet ratified the convention.17
10 See Max Rood, New Developments Within the ILO Supervisory System, in
LABOUR LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 87 (Roger Blanpain ed., 2001).
" Id. at 87.
12 Id. at 88.
13 Id.
14 Id.; see also ILO Constitution, supra note 7, art. 19, para. 5(c).
15 Rood, supra note 10, at 88.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 89.
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The ILO also uses the complaint procedure, which consists of
two different systems: one for employees or organizations
representing employees bringing complaints against member states
for non-compliance, 8 and one allowing member states to bring
complaints for non-compliance against each other.19 The first
system is governed by Article 24 of the ILO Constitution, and the
second by Article 26.20 Article 24 requires that a member have
ratified the treaty as a precursor to lodging a complaint. Article
26 requires ratification of the treaty by both the state bringing the
complaint and the state with the claimed breach of the
Convention.
22
Throughout the history of the ILO, these procedures have been
used infrequently. Instead, an extra-constitutionally 23  based
method known as the "freedom of association procedure" has
generally been adopted as the preferred method for bringing
member states into compliance.24 This procedure finds its basis in
an agreement between the ILO's governing body and the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.2 ' The
mission of the agreement was accomplished through a Fact
Finding and Conciliation Committee on Freedom of Association
(FFCC).26 The FFCC was replaced in 1951 with the Freedom of
Association Committee (CFA) after the first met with opposition.27
However, the CFA deals only with freedom of association
concerns such as formation of unions, and collective bargaining.28
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 ILO Constitution, supra note 7, art. 24.
22 Id. art. 26.
23 See generally ILO Constitution, supra note 7.
24 Rood, supra note 10, at 89.
25 Id.
26 See id.
27 See id. at 90 ("The early history of the FFCC shows that it met with considerable
doubt and lack of cooperation on the part of ILO Member States. It also turned out to
encounter serious difficulties as it could only operate with the consent of the defendant
State and that consensus hardly ever came about.").
28 See id. ("Allegations will be directed against the governments of the member
States irrespective of whether the State concerned has or has not ratified the relevant
Conventions, No.87 on the Right to Association and Protection of the right to Organize
2006]
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Unlike the FFCC, the CFA is accountable to the ILO's governing
body and has no accountability to the Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations. 9
These committees were designed to perform initial
investigations of freedom of association complaints. 30  After
completion of the examination the committees' job was to make a
report to the governing body.31 The governing body would, in
turn pass the report on to the FFCC for further review. 32  After
replacing the FFCC, the CFA began examining complaints in full
before presenting them to the full board for approval of their
findings and recommendations. 33 A complaint may be brought by
"governments or organizations of workers or employers, be they
national or international."'34
C. Women's Issues and the ILO
One of the major areas where the ILO seeks to promote change
relates to gender discrimination. For as many years as they have
found themselves in the workplace, women have been subject to
varying levels of discrimination based on their gender.35
Recognizing this problem, conventions concerning maternity
protection and night work for women were among the first six of
the ILO's Conventions promulgated in 1919.36
III. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
or No. 98 on the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.").
29 Id. ("[The CFA] consisted of nine members of that body (three out of every of
the three groups, i.e. governments, workers, and employers) and was chaired by an
independent chairman who was not a member of the governing body or for that matter of
the new committee itself.").
30 Rood, supra note 10, at 90.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See id.
35 Id. at 69 ("Women are joining the world's workforce at an accelerating pace but
mostly at the bottom in low paid, low status, precarious jobs. The economic and social
cost of discrimination particularly against women.., is incalculable.").
36 About the ILO, supra note 4. The other conventions it adopted in 1919
concerned "hours of work in industry, unemployment ... minimum age and night work
for young persons in industry." Id.
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Discrimination Against Women
A second source of protection for women's rights in the
international workforce is the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW).37 CEDAW was adopted in 1979 by the UN General
Assembly.38 The Convention strives to "[define] what constitutes
discrimination against women and sets up an agenda for national
action to end such discrimination.,
39
The definition of discrimination against women outlined in
CEDAW is as follows:
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of
their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.4°
When a country accepts the provisions of the Convention, it
commits itself to take certain steps to end discrimination against
women. Countries are supposed to incorporate gender equality
protections into their legal systems to rid their laws of
discriminatory provisions against women, to prohibit further
discrimination, and to set up public bodies to promote protecting
women against discrimination. 41 Differentiating itself from other
human rights treaties, CEDAW alone recognizes the reproductive
rights of women.42
By March 2004, over 175 states were parties to CEDAW.43
Signatories to the Convention are obliged to put its provisions into
practice and submit reports every four years that explain the steps
they have taken to comply with the treaty.' Despite these lofty
37 United Nations, Convention on All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm [hereinafter Text of the
Convention].
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Text of the Convention, supra note 37.
44 Id.
2006]
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goals, major world powers-like the United States-have not
become parties to the CEDAW Convention,45 while many of the
others who have become parties have not made great strides to
comply with its terms.'
In the area of monitoring and enforcement, the Convention set
up a Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women.47 It consists of an independent committee of experts
representing "different forms of civilization as well as principal
legal systems.'48
IV. Maternity Protection ILO Conventions
The Maternity Protection Convention was among the first of
the conventions promulgated by the ILO related to the protection
of women's rights. It was enacted in 1919 4 ' and was ratified by
thirty-three countries.5 ° The Convention addressed the fate of
women working in both public and private industrial and
commercial undertakings." Article 3 of the Maternity Protection
Convention made it unlawful, for (publicly or privately employed)
women, "to work during the six weeks following
confinement. 5 2  It required that, while on leave, the woman be
paid enough to support herself and the child, and that she be given
free birthing services. 53 The Convention protected the woman s
rights to these benefits even where her doctor made a mistake in
estimating her due date for giving birth.54 Finally, the Convention
45 United Nations, Convention on All Forms of Discrimination against Women:
Country Reports, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reports.htm#m.
46 See infra Part VI.A-C.
47 Text of the Convention, supra note 37.
48 Id.
49 Maternity Protection Convention, Nov. 28, 1919, ILOLEX C3, http://www.ilo
.org/ilolex/english/convdispl.
50 Id.
51 Id. An industrial undertaking includes "(a) mines, [and] quarries . . .; (b)
industries in which articles are manufactured . . . ; (c) construction, reconstruction,
maintenance, repair, alteration, or demolition ... ; (d) transport of passengers or goods..
. but excluding transport by hand." Id. A commercial undertaking includes: "any place
where articles are sold or where commerce is carried on." Id.
52 Id.
53 Maternity Protection Convention, supra note 49, art. 3.
54 Id.
[Vol. 31
WORKING WOMEN AND THE ILO
added that a woman needing to remain out of work for longer than
a period of six weeks for a medically certified reason resulting
from the pregnancy-and making her unfit for work-could not
be given notice of dismissal during her absence.55
In 1952 the ILO adopted another Maternity Protection
Convention carrying the same name.56 The 1952 version provides
a broader definition of commercial undertaking with a view to
reaching a broader array of occupations." It also adds a third job
classification: "agricultural occupations. '58
Moreover, the 1952 Convention strengthened protections in
other ways, including lengthening the maternity leave to twelve
weeks.59 It mandates that pregnant women be given no less than
six weeks of time off work after giving birth.6 0  The other six
weeks could be taken before and/or after the mandated six-week
minimum.6 1 The Convention adds:
(5) In case of illness medically certified arising out of
pregnancy, national laws or regulations shall provide for
additional leave before confinement, the maximum duration of
which may be fixed by the competent authority. (6) In case of
illness medically certified arising out of confinement, the
woman shall be entitled to an extension of the leave after
confinement, the maximum duration of which may be fixed by
the competent authority.62
55 See id. art. 4.
56 Maternity Protection Convention (Revised), June 28, 1952, ILOLEX C103,
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1 .htm.
57 Id. art. 1, § 3. It reads:
For the purpose of this Convention, the term non-industrial occupations
includes all occupations which are carried on in or in connection with . . .(a)
commercial establishments; (b) postal and telecommunication services; (c)
establishments and administrative services in which the persons employed are
mainly engaged in clerical work ....
Id. (emphasis added).
58 An agricultural occupation is defined as "[any occupation] carried on in
agricultural undertakings, including plantations and large-scale industrialized agricultural
undertakings." Id. art. 1, § 4.
59 Maternity Protection Convention (Revised), supra note 56.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. art. 6.
2006]
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The 1952 Convention also outlines the benefits a woman is to
receive while on maternity leave 63 and continues to prevent her
employer from dismissing her as an employee while on leave.'
The most recent Maternity Protection Convention was
promulgated by the ILO in 2000. It differs in several ways from
the 1952 Convention. It does not seek to classify forms of work
into which women's employment situations might fall, simply
stating, "this Convention applies to all employed women,
including those in atypical forms of dependent work.,
65
Additionally, the Convention requires that pregnant and nursing
women are not obliged to do types of work that would prove
detrimental to their health or their children's health.66 It extends
the maternity leave mandate to a period of fourteen weeks, and
adds a provision which preserves a woman's right to her job
should complications in her pregnancy arise.67  This means that
when she is able to return to work her employer has to provide her
with the same or an equivalent position paid at the same rate at the
63 Id. art. 4, §§ 1-8.
The convention requires that while on maternity leave women should receive
certain cash and benefits as income; that they receive pre- and post- natal care;
that women who don't qualify for these benefits be provided benefits from
social assistance funds; and that employers not be held individually liable for
paying these benefits to the pregnant women he employs.
Id.
64 Maternity Protection Convention (Revised), supra note 56, art. 6.
65 Maternity Protection Convention (2000), June 15, 2000, ILOLEX C183, art. 1,
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl.htm [hereinafter Maternity Protection
Convention 2000]. This Convention provides a limited "out" for signatories stating
"however, each Member which ratifies this Convention may, after consulting the
representative organizations of employers and workers concerned, exclude wholly or
partly from the scope of the Convention limited categories of workers when its
application to them would raise special problems of a substantial nature." Id. art. 2, § 2.
66 Id. art. 3.
67 Id. art. 4, § 1 (providing for the fourteen-week maternity leave); id. art. 5
(preserving the right to a job).
On production of a medical certificate, leave shall be provided before or after
the maternity leave period in the case of illness, complications or risk of
complications arising out of pregnancy or childbirth. The nature and the
maximum duration of such leave may be specified in accordance with national
law and practice.
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end of her maternity leave.68 This provision, like its predecessors,
makes it unlawful for an employer to terminate a woman during
her maternity leave 69 if the reason for the termination relates to the
pregnancy, childbirth, or nursing.7°
While it appears that these conventions, if enforced, would do
much to protect pregnant women in the workforce, none of them
speak to discriminatory practices that affect women who are
applying for jobs, a major concern in many ILO member states.7'
There is some evidence that the Committee of Experts of the ILO
does not view the existence of such a legal relationship necessary
for mounting a claim.72 A problem arises, because there are no
precedents on this issue in North or South America. 73 Experts at
Human Rights Watch note that:
To [their] knowledge, there is as yet no jurisprudence in the
Americas that flows from ILO Convention 111, but in Europe, a
1991 case illustrated how this standard can be invoked. The
European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that pregnancy-based
68 See Maternity Protection Convention 2000, supra note 65, art. 8, § 2.
69 Id.
(1) It shall be unlawful for an employer to terminate the employment of a
woman during her pregnancy or absence on leave referred to in Articles 4 or 5
or during a period following her return to work to be prescribed by national
laws or regulations, except on grounds unrelated to the pregnancy or birth of the
child and its consequences or nursing. The burden of proving that the reasons
for dismissal are unrelated to pregnancy or childbirth and its consequences or
nursing shall rest on the employer. (2) A woman is guaranteed the right to
return to the same position or an equivalent position paid at the same rate at the
end of her maternity leave.
Id.
70 Id.
71 See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
72 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MEXICO, No GUARANTEES: SEX DISCRIMINATION IN
MEXICO'S MAQUILADORA SECTOR 26 (1996), http://hrw.org/reports/1996/Mexi0896.htm
[hereinafter MEXICO, No GUARANTEES].
Thus, for example, the ILO Convention 111 on Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation specifically prohibits discrimination based on
gender in access to employment. The ILO Committee of Experts has
interpreted the scope of Convention 11 to prohibit pregnancy discrimination as
a form of sex discrimination.
Id. (emphasis added).
73 Id.
20061
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discrimination constitutes impermissible sex discrimination.
Although the findings of the ECJ are not binding on the
Americas, the court's holding does provide a persuasive
interpretation of pregnancy-based discrimination as a form of
sex discrimination and recognizes it as obstructing women's
equal access to employment opportunities. 74
Considering this apparent ambiguity in the jurisprudence on the
subject of pregnancy discrimination, and the lack of enforcement
in many cases, member states may be unlikely to undertake
reforms in this area.
V. Selected Conventions Dealing with Equality of
Opportunity
In 1958, the ILO adopted a convention titled "Discrimination
(Employment and Occupation) Convention., 75  The Convention
defines discrimination as "any distinction, exclusion or preference
made on the basis of ... sex ... which has the effect of nullifying
or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment
or occupation . ,,76
The Convention requires member states to pursue national
policies that promote equality of opportunity and treatment in
employment opportunities, with the aim of ending discrimination. 7
One hundred sixty-three countries signed on to this Convention.78
Since the Discrimination Convention did not speak to
discrimination resulting from a worker's family responsibilities,
the ILO took action in 1981 by promulgating the "Workers with
Family Responsibilities Convention,"7 9 which incorporates into the
1958 Discrimination Convention protection from discrimination-
based on a worker's family responsibilities.8"
74 Id.
75 See Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, June 25, 1958,
ILOLEX C11, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl.htm.
76 Id. art. 1, § 1 (emphasis added). The act provides an exception to the
classification of discrimination where the "distinction, exclusion or preference in respect
of a particular job based on the inherent requirements thereof .... Id. art. 1, § 2.
77 Id. art. 2.
78 Id.
79 See Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, June 23, 1981, ILOLEX
C 156, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl.htm.
80 The preamble to the Convention begins, "Recalling that the Discrimination
[Vol. 31
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The provision applies to all spheres of economic activity and
all classes of workers. 81  It also incorporates by reference the
definition of discrimination set forth in the 1958 Discrimination
(Employment and Occupation) Convention.82 It aims to give such
workers-both men and women-the right to "free choice of
employment," and outlaws the termination of employees solely on
the basis of their family responsibilities.83 Despite these aims, the
provision neglects to mention other employment decisions-like
hiring-that might be made on the basis of a worker's family
responsibilities, and therefore fails to provide protection in that
area. Other problems arise with respect to enforcement of these
provisions, since some member states refuse to sign on to the
Conventions and remain non-compliant with its terms.84
VI. ILO Reporting and Complaint Procedures
The ILO requires that member states give periodic reports on
their compliance with the organization's conventions.85 Article 22
states:
Each of the Members agrees to make an annual report to the
International Labour Office on the measures which it has taken
to give effect to the provisions of Conventions to which it is a
party. These reports shall be made in such form and shall
contain such particulars as the Governing Body may request.86
Article 24 outlines the complaint procedure.
In the event of any representation being made to the
International Labour Office by an industrial association of
employers or of workers that any of the Members has failed to
secure in any respect the effective observance within its
jurisdiction of any Convention to which it is a party, the
Governing Body may communicate this representation to the
(Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958, does not expressly cover distinctions
made on the basis of family responsibilities, and considering that supplementary
standards are necessary in this respect." Id.
81 Id. art. 2.
82 Id. art. 3, §2.
83 Id. art. 4.
84 Id. art. 8.
85 See infra Part II.B.
86 ILO Constitution, supra note 7, art. 22.
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government against which it is made, and may invite that
government to make such statement on the subject as it may
think fit.8
7
However, it has been noted that most member states have
preferred not to use these methods to redress grievances.88 On the
organization's website, there appear to be no published documents
pertaining to such reports or complaints. 89 As discussed in the
next section, many ILO members remain in violation of the very
principles the organization seeks to promote.
90
A. Case Study: Guatemala
Guatemala is an ILO member nation. It signed on to the
above-mentioned 1952 Maternity Protection Convention in 1982, 9'
but did not ratify the 2000 version of the Convention.92 It is also a
signatory to the Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention
19819' and the Anti-Discrimination Convention 1958. 9' Despite
its signatures and agreements to be bound by the terms of the
Conventions, Guatemala's maquila 95 industry, as well as many
employers in its domestic sector, are in violation of many of the
above-mentioned ILO Conventions, as well as CEDAW.96
Guatemalan women are a particularly vulnerable segment of
the population because they lack education in comparison to their
male counterparts.97 Many of these women, most of whom have
87 Id. art. 24.
88 See supra Part VI (discussing preferred methods for redress of grievances).
89 See generally, ILO, http://www.ILO.org.
90 See infra Part IV.A-C.
91 See Maternity Protection Convention (Revised), supra note 56.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Maquila is the short form of the word maquiladora. Originally associated with
the milling process, it became associated with another type of process in Mexico-
assembling imported component parts for re-export. Maquilas: What is a Maquila?,
http://www.maquilasolidarity.org/resources/maquilas/whatis.htm.
96 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FROM THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE FACTORY: SEX
DISCRIMINATION IN THE GUATEMALAN LABOR FORCE 1-5 (2002), http://hrw.org/reports
/2002/guat/ [hereinafter FROM THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE FACTORY].
97 Id. at 58. Guatemalans with little formal education and lacking in job training
have few options for paid employment. As a result many have chosen domestic service,
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completed some level of elementary school,98 work in either the
domestic sector or in the maquiladora (or maquila) industry. In
Guatemala, the maquila industry in Guatemala is heavily
concentrated with apparel manufacturing.99 Employers are drawn
to hire these workers for various reasons, one of which is the
vulnerability of the workers.
The industry showed a preference for female labor early on for
a variety of reasons. First, women are culturally associated with
sewing, and are therefore more likely to have had some exposure
to this kind of work and be able to operate a sewing machine more
adeptly than a man. Second, women-especially younger
women-are thought to have nimble hands and are assumed to be
more dexterous and faster than men. Third, women are considered
more obedient and less combative than men."°° These perceived
traits result in the exploitation of Guatemalan women in the
workplace.
Access to health care, and especially health care related to
child bearing, is one of the major areas in which violation of both
women working in the maquila industry and as domestic servants
occurs."' Employers of both sets of women deny the women
access to the national health care system. 10 2 The Guatemalan labor
code requires all employers with more than three employees to
register them with the Guatemalan Institute for Social Security.'0 3
However, domestic workers are seldom employed by persons
having greater than three employees, so their employers need not
garner this health care policy for them.'04 Ninety-eight percent of
the persons employed in the domestic sector are women. 5 When
but more recently some are choosing to work in the maquilas. Id.
98 Id. at 85 ("Poor women, with little or no education, suffer gender specific abuses
when they work as domestic workers or maquiladora line operators.").
99 The maquila industry, especially apparel manufacturing, has expanded rapidly
since the 1980s. There are at least 250 apparel maquilas in Guatemala, employing some
80,000 workers, approximately eighty percent of whom are women. Id. at 3.
100 Id. at 84.
101 FROM THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE FACTORY, supra note 96, at 39.
102 Id. at 39, 77 & 124.
103 The Guatemalan Institute for Social Security is an employee health care system.
Id. at76.
104 Id. at 39, 76.
105 Id. at 49.
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these women become ill outside the home, they are forced to pay
for their own health care,' ° despite their meager salaries.1
0 7
Pregnancy, which is logically considered a health care concern
contracted outside the home, is also a major issue. Employers
who have over three employees-the statutory trigger number for
registration compliance-exacerbate the situation by consistently
shirking their responsibility to pay the health care costs for
their employees. 0 8  Since the Guatemalan system is marked by
remarkably small monetary penalties, extended judicial proceedings,
and problems with enforcing other penalties, these employers act
with veritable impunity.'°9
Women working in the maquila industry face other obstacles
to receiving health care, especially lack of access to reproductive
care." 0 While these workers do have the right to make use of the
employee health care system, many of them often find that their
use is impeded for several reasons. For example, their managers
often fail to enroll employees in the system, and even those who
are enrolled are denied time off, and necessary certificates needed
106 Id.
Article 165 of the labor code outlines the rights and obligations of employers in
case of illness on the part of the domestic worker. Theses stipulations combine
paternalism with serious disregard for these workers' rights. Where a domestic
worker contracts a contagious disease within the household, her employer must
assume all medical costs toward recovery and pay the worker's salary until such
time.
FROM THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE FACTORY, supra note 96, at 76.
107 Human Rights Watch reports that "[w]hile the majority of workers we
interviewed appeared to earn approximately Q722 (U.S. $96) per month, Human Rights
Watch spoke with one live-in domestic worker who had recently earned as little as Q400
(U.S. $53) per month, as well as to another who at the time of the interview was earning
QI ,100 (U.S. $147) per month." Id. at 67.
108 Id. at 78.
109 Id. at 118.
110 Some would argue that discrimination against pregnant women is not rightly
considered discrimination on the basis of gender. Others counter that
pregnancy as a condition is inextricably linked and specific to being female.
Consequently, when women are treated adversely by their employers or
potential employers because they are pregnant or because they may become
pregnant, they are being discriminated against on the grounds of sex.
Id. at 27.
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to access health services."' Guatemala's last published report to
CEDAW1 2 acknowledges that expectant and new mothers should
not have their employment terminated, and that if they are
terminated, the decision should be authorized by a judge. That
report goes on to add that in 2001 the Guatemalan labor laws were
changed to raise fines for violators." 3 Although less frequently
than in the past, violations still occur despite this mandate." 4 In
Guatemala, the inspectorate was given forty-two reports of
terminations in violation of established norms concerning pregnant
and breast-feeding women. 115  These reports were submitted in
1998 and through August of 1999.116 Women report having been
fired after not informing their employers of their pregnancies. 11
7
Some such employers cite as justification that "pregnant
employees cannot work extra hours, cannot stand for long periods
of time, and do not work as hard as others."" 8
Several other violations continue to persist in the maquila
sector. The latest Maternity Protection Convention mandates that
once a new mother has returned to work from her maternity leave,
she should be given breaks so she may breastfeed; alternatively,
her daily work hours should be reduced. Whatever option the
employer chooses, he is supposed to pay the employee for the time
she spends nursing." 9  Employers are not always willing to
comply with this provision, but the Guatemalan legislature has
incorporated the provision into its labor code. 2 °  However,
III Id. at 18.
112 See U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Fifth Periodic Report of
State Parties: Guatemala, 9, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GUA/5 (Jan. 17, 2002).
113 Id. at9.
114 FROM THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE FACTORY, supra note 96, at 106.
115 Id. at 60.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 31.
120 FROM THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE FACTORY, supra note 96, at 31-32 ("Article 151..
prohibits the firing of pregnant and breastfeeding women, except with just cause and
special authorization from a labor judge.").
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employers routinely block worker access to these maternity
rights.' 2' "To enjoy the right of 'immobility,' pregnant women
must first advise their employers verbally and then within two
months provide a medical certificate confirming their status.' 22 It
is reported that for even those women who are given
accommodations, such accommodations do not always comply
with the applicable law. 2
3
Another major concern for women working in the maquila
industry in Guatemala is blatant violations of their privacy
rights. 124  Many women working in the maquila industry are
questioned about their reproductive status when they apply for
jobs in the factories. 125
Many Guatemalan maquilas have adopted practices to identify
pregnant female job applicants in order to deny them
employment. Female applicants for jobs in the maquilas are
routinely required to state whether they are pregnant as a
condition of employment. The practice is widespread, usually
taking the form of a direct question on the application from, or a
verbal question in individual or group hiring interviews ....
Some maquilas go further and require pregnancy exams.
126
The United Nations Human Rights Committee takes the
position that "obliging disclosure information related to
prospective workers' pregnancy status, as a condition of
employment, invades women's privacy. "127 Additionally, many
121 Id. at 102.
122 Id. at 32.
123 One woman interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported having been asked to
resign before the birth of her child with the promise that she would be rehired once she
returned to work. She was rehired, but while out of work was not paid and did not
receive any health care benefits. Another interviewee noted that while she was given the
breastfeeding concession, her employer began counting the breastfeeding time allotment
of ten months from the time she went on maternity leave instead of from the time she
returned to work from leave. Id. at 108.
124 Id. at 42. ('The UDHR, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the
ICCPR 3 guarantee a right to privacy.")
125 Id. at 88.
126 FROM THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE FACTORY, supra note 96, at 88.
127 Id. at 42.
The [International Convention on Civil and Political Rights] guarantee[s]
against all such interferences and attacks whether they emanate from State
authorities or from natural or legal persons. The obligations imposed by this
[Vol. 31
WORKING WOMEN AND THE ILO
women are subjected to invasive searches, in plain-view, each day
as they enter into and leave their factories.1
28
Workers consistently objected to the daily pat-down searches
they must endure upon entering and leaving most factories.
These searches generally take place outside, near the main door,
where men and women form parallel separate lines to be
searched by same sex guards . . . . Several women . . .
[complain] that these searches, in and of themselves often
extremely intrusive, provided occasions for inappropriate
commentary from male colleagues.
29
The vulnerability and lack of education of these employees, much
less their lack of knowledge regarding avenues of recourse, likely
causes most to not take action against their employers.
Women in the domestic sector endure further forms of
discrimination. Like their counterparts in the maquila industry,
they face discrimination with respect to their reproductive health
and access to health care. 3° On the other hand, women working in
the domestic sector are much more likely to become the victims of
sexual harassment.'
31
Guatemala is a signatory to CEDAW 32  Even though that
convention does not specifically address sexual harassment the
CEDAW committee believes this behavior constitutes gender-
article require the State to give effect to the prohibition against such
interferences and attacks as well as to the protection of the rights. The [U.N.
Human Rights Committee] has interpreted the right to privacy to mean that
states have an obligation to 'provide the legislative framework prohibiting such
acts by natural or legal persons. The Guatemalan government has a duty to
protect its citizens from invasions of their privacy by such private actors as
maquila personnel.
Id. Guatemala has ratified the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights.
See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of
Ratification of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties (2004),
www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
128 FROM THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE FACTORY, supra note 96, at 86.
129 Id.
130 FROM THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE FACTORY, supra note 96, at 48 (noting that
employers routinely refuse to uphold their obligation to pay health care costs).
131 Id. at 2.
132 United Nations, CEDAW: State parties, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw
/cedaw/states.htm [hereinafter CEDAW: State parties].
20061
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
based violence which is prohibited by the convention. 3 3  The
conmittee states:
Sexual harassment includes unwelcome sexually determined
behavior as physical contact and advances, sexually coloured
remarks, showing pornography and sexual demands, whether by
words or actions. Such conduct can be humiliating and may
constitute a health and safety problem; it is discriminatory when
the woman has reasonable grounds to believe that her objection
would disadvantage her in connection with her employment
including recruitment and promotion, or when it creates a hostile
working environment.
134
Guatemalan women report that "it is not uncommon for young
. . . men . . . to initiate themselves sexually with the family
domestic worker."135  The country's first labor minister
acknowledges that "there are cases of parents who want their son
to have his first sexual experiences with the young woman
employed as a domestic [in their home].' 36 Many women who
experience these conditions in the home leave their jobs soon after
such incidents occur. 137  Further complicating this issue, as of
January 2002, Guatemala had no law addressing sexual
harassment.1 38
Sexual harassment is a violation of the ILO Convention titled
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention,
1958 .139 That provision includes in its prohibitions "any
distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of... sex..
which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of
133 FROM THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE FACTORY, supra note 96, at 33.
134 Id. at 33-34.
135 Id. at 78.
136 Id. at 79.
137 Id. This statement applies to the women that HRW interviewed for this report.
"None of the women Human Rights Watch spoke with had ever tried to lodge a legal
complaint against their Aggressors." Id. Citing a rationale, "Olimpia Romero Perez, an
organizer with CENTRACAP, explained, 'It's unlikely that women want to file for
sexual harassment, because they don't want to expose themselves, because they lack the
resources, and because there's no law."' FROM THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE FACTORY, supra
note 96, at 82.
138 Id. at 82.
139 See Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, supra note 75.
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opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation." ' 40 Sexual
harassment could be considered a violation because women are
treated in a distinct manner on the basis of their gender and that
action impairs their equal treatment in the workforce. The
provision mandates:
each Member for which this Convention is in force undertakes
to declare and pursue a national policy designed to promote, by
methods appropriate to national conditions and practice, equality
of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and
occupation, with a view to eliminating any discrimination in
respect thereof. 
141
Guatemala is a signatory to this Convention and is therefore bound
by its terms, 14 2 but it is clearly not in compliance with the
provisions when one considers that Guatemala has not established
any laws prohibiting this employment practice. 1
43
Domestic workers also experience discrimination with respect
to the lack of a minimum wage in their sector. The domestic
workers "work long, often unpredictable hours performing back-
breaking tasks: fetching water, washing clothes (usually by hand),
ironing, washing dishes, scrubbing and mopping floors, dusting,
shopping, cooking, making beds, washing windows, walking dogs,
and caring for children, among other tasks."'14  Adding to this
problem, the labor code in Guatemala does not apply workday
limitations to domestic workers.'45  Most other workers in
Guatemala have the right to an eight-hour workday. 4 6 By statute,
domestic workers are only required to receive ten hours for
resting, eight of which must be consecutive.'47
The Guatemalan labor code only requires that the wage of the
domestic worker be "decided between the employer and the
worker., 148 Because many women lack both education and other
140 See id. art.1.
141 Id. art. 2.
142 CEDAW: State parties, supra note 132.
143 FROM THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE FACTORY, supra note 96, at 33.
144 Id. at 66.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 42.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 43.
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job opportunities, they are particularly vulnerable and many feel
forced to take jobs that pay poorly and maintain deplorable work
conditions.149 Additionally, domestic servants are not afforded a
legal right to be free of work on national holidays or Sundays; the
only accommodation they are given for such days is sixteen hours
of rest (instead of the normal ten hours). 50 Because the labor code
does not adequately encompass or protect women working in the
domestic sector, Guatemala stands in violation of several
international Conventions.
B. Case Study: Mexico
Mexico is also member nation of the ILO, but it has never
signed on to any of the above-mentioned Maternity Protection
Conventions, or the Workers with Family Responsibilities
Convention of 1981.' Mexico signed the Anti-Discrimination
Convention of 1958 in 1961152 and has also signed the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women. 5 1 In spite of its lack of signatures on some of the above-
mentioned treaties, Mexico's federal labor laws are more
progressive than those in the United States. 54
Mexico's domestic law guarantees equality between men and
women, prohibits sex discrimination, protects women workers
during pregnancy, and guarantees the right to decide freely and
responsibly on the number and spacing of one's children ....
Article 170(1) of the federal labor [c]ode states: 'During
pregnancy, [a woman worker] will not perform work that
149 For example, women report not being allowed to eat the food that they cook and
serve for their employers. "Many domestic workers complained of being given less food
or food of lower quality than the family and not being allowed time to eat." One woman
reported that "she had to prepare food for the couple she worked for, and was only given
what was left over." Id.
150 FROM THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE FACTORY, supra note 96, at 70. This means these
women still are required to work eight hours on these holidays.
151 Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, supra note 79.
152 Id. However, it should be reiterated that just because a member state has not
signed onto a particular convention does not mean that the member will not be asked to
report on its actions to comply with its mandates.
153 See CEDAW: State Parties, supra note 132 (noting that Mexico became a
signatory in 1981).
154 MEXICO, No GUARANTEES, supra note 72, at 31.
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requires considerable force and signifies a danger for her health
in relation to gestation .... 155
The problem with these progressive Mexican laws is that "in
terms of interpretation and enforcement, [Mexico] is centuries
behind."'15 6  Despite its ratification of the Anti-Discrimination
Convention and agreements to report on compliance with the
terms of the Conventions as a result of being an ILO member
state, Mexico's maquila industry-like Guatemala's-is in
violation of many of the aforementioned ILO Conventions, as well
as CEDAW.
1. Violations in the Maquiladora Sector
Maquiladoras, or export-processing factories, along the U.S.-
Mexico border account for over US$29 billion in export earnings
for Mexico and employ over 500,000 workers.'57 The presence of
the maquila industry in Mexico dates back over forty years having158
been created in 1965. Today, at least half of the people working
in this sector in Mexico are women, and they earn more at
maquiladora jobs than they could in any other industry in Northern
Mexico. 159
The women working in this industry have few alternatives for
gainful employment. Many of the women are poor and under-
educated.1 60 The majority of them did not finish their primary
155 Id. It is also noted that
according to the federal labor code, companies are required to protect pregnant
women from executing tasks that would cause danger to their health in relation
to the fetus; pay pregnant women maternity leave of six weeks before delivery
and six weeks after delivery; allow new mothers two paid extra breaks of half
hour each to breast feed their infants; and allow pregnant women to take an
extra sixty days off while receiving fifty percent of their salary, if they so desire
apart from the twelve weeks of maternity leave, so long as no more than one
year after birth has passed.
Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Industry goals included industrializing the northern boarder area, providing
employment to such an under-employed population, and slowing the illegal immigration
across the U.S.-Mexico boarder to obtain work. Id.
159 MEXICo, No GUARANTEES, supra note 72.
160 Id.
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education and have little to no work experience outside this sector
besides domestic service, which would provide them much less
pay, decreased flexibility, and fewer health benefits.16 1 They live
in a society in which the official unemployment rate stands at
6.3%, and because there are so few other job opportunities it
would prove inadvisable to protest.1 62 These women also often
express their disinclination toward challenging discriminatory
actions because of a lack of other suitable job opportunities. 163
Many of these women move far away from their homes in more
central and southern parts of Mexico in order to come to the
border to work in the maquiladoras. "
One of the maquiladora sector's violations of Mexican Federal
law, ILO Conventions, and CEDAW concerns the hiring and
retention of pregnant women. In terms of money and jobs,
production from the maquila industry is worth a great deal.
165
Women are discriminated against in ways that only women can be:
they are required to take pregnancy tests as a condition of
employment, they are denied work if they are pregnant, and they
are often forced to resign if they become pregnant soon after being
hired. 166 Women are also often required to give blood or urine
samples as a part of the interview process.'67 Once employed,
many are asked very private questions about their use of
contraceptives, as well as the timeliness of their menstrual
cycles. 168  Women who become pregnant after being hired are
frequently forced to resign from their jobs by supervisors who use
161 Id.at 1.
162 Id. ("Mexico's official, national unemployment figures are widely acknowledged
by the U.S. Commerce Department and other U.S. agencies as being significantly
underestimated.").
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 1. ("For the Mexican government, there are economic disincentives to
regulating closely the conduct of these companies, given the number of people the
maquliadora industry employs and the amount of foreign currency earnings it
produces.")
166 MEXICO, No GUARANTEES, supra note 72, at 1.
167 Id. at 4.
168 Id. In fact, one woman who was being considered for employment and whose
menstrual cycle was late was told return when she got her period. She did so, and when
she presented to the employer a urine sample containing blood, she was hired. Id. at 23.
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methods such as reassigning them to more physically demanding
work-forcing a pregnant worker to chose between a healthy, full-
term pregnancy and her job. 169
Despite these blatant infringements "the Mexican government
has done little to acknowledge or remedy violations of women's
rights to nondiscrimination and to privacy."17 These actions run
in direct contravention to ILO mandates,'71 as well as CEDAW.
17 2
It has been posited that the government's failure to stop these
kinds of discrimination "infringes on women's right to decide
freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their
children."' 73  This failure is in direct contravention CEDAW's
mandate that countries ensure that women be allowed to decide
freely on the number of children they will have and when they will
have them. 17
4
The companies involved in the discrimination do so in order to
save money.'75 Maquiladora owners seek out women to work in
their facilities "because they view them, as more diligent and hard-
working than men and consider women's hands more adept at
executing the repetitive motions necessary for rote assembly
work."'17 6 The women have increased attractiveness as workers
because they are among the most vulnerable members of the
population.'77 Most of these women are under-educated, have
little job-experience, and have no alternative to working in the
169 Id. at 23. It should be noted that not all pregnant women who are detected
working in maquilas are forced to resign. The ones who are allowed to stay are
generally women who have
worked at the maquiladora for more than a year and [who get] along well with
[their supervisor]. Women [seem] far more likely to lose their jobs than not
when they [have] been working at the maquiladora for less than one year and/or
[do] not get along well with their supervisors."
Id. at 23-24.
170 Id.
171 See, e.g., Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, supra note 79, art.
4.
172 See MEXICO, No GUARANTEES, supra note 72, at 28.
173 ld. at 31.
174 Id. at 28.
175 Id. at 4.
176 Id.
177 Id.
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maquila industry except for domestic work. Employers do not
choose men because hiring men to do these jobs "would require
higher wages, better working conditions and more flexible work
schedules, all of which would increase labor costs and reduce
capitalist gains." 17 8  Critics of these practices note that the
government of Mexico allows discrimination based on pregnancy
status in the private sector, even though such practices violate the
country's international obligations to provide equal protection of
the laws as well as ensure the human rights of all its occupants,
much less Mexico's own domestic policies guaranteeing similar
protections. 179
2. Theory by Which These Actions Are Classified as
Discrimination
Undoubtedly, some do not consider preferences based on a
potential employee's status as pregnant or not pregnant as
discrimination based on sex. Opponents of this view follow the
reasoning that:
[p]regnancy as a condition is inextricably linked and specific to
being female. Consequently when women are treated differently
by their employers or potential employers because they are
pregnant, they are being subjected to requirements for
employment to which men are not. Thus pregnancy-based
discrimination constitutes a form of sex discrimination by
targeting a condition only women experience. 18
0
C. Case Study: El Salvador
El Salvador is a member nation of the ILO; however, it never
signed the 1952 Maternity Protection Convention, nor did it ratify
the 2000 version of the Convention.'81 It did, however, sign
the Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention of 198 1,182
and the Anti-Discrimination Convention of 1958.183 Despite its
178 MExICO, No GUARANTEES, supra note 72, at 28.
179 Id. at 25.
180 Id. at 2.
181 See Maternity Protection Convention (Revised), supra note 56; Maternity
Protection Convention (2000), supra note 65 (listing the ratifying parties).
182 See Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, supra note 79.
183 Id.
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agreement to be bound by the terms of these Conventions, El
Salvador's maquila industry is in violation of many of the above-
mentioned ILO Conventions, its own domestic labor provisions, 84
and CEDAW.
The maquila industry in El Salvador employs greater than
60,000 people and produces around fifty-nine percent of all
exports. 85 The women working in this industry are presented with
several hurdles to fair treatment. Employers have come to see
labor rights standards as optional treating violations as something
that can be cured, if need by, with . . . small payments [to
aggrieved workers], a cost of doing business."'8 6
Many workers in this industry are denied the right to
collectively bargain.'87 Employers use many tactics to accomplish
this goal including firing, suspending, pressuring to leave, and
blacklisting union members. 188 Such violations, gone unchecked,
violate several international conventions. It is noted that
by permitting legislative impediments to the right to freedom of
association and inadequately enforcing the weak existing laws,
El Salvador violated its United Nations (U.N.) and Organization
of America States (OAS) treaty obligations and its duty as an
International Labour Organization (ILO) member to respect,
protect, and promote workers' right to organize.' 8 9
In particular, many women in El Salvador are forced to pay
into Social Security while their employers do not turn over the
funds to the government to cover their health insurance.' 90 This
leaves workers with less take-home pay and without health care
coverage. Because they cannot be seen at government-run clinics,
184 HUMAN RIGHTS WORK, DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE: EL SALVADOR'S FAILURE TO
PROTECT WORKER'S RIGHTS 2 (2003), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/elsalvadorl203
/elsalvadorl203.pdf [hereinafter DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE] ("Because Labor Laws are
weak and government enforcement is often begrudging or nonexistent, employers who
flout the law have little worry that they will suffer significant consequences.").
185 Id. at 82.
186 Id. at 2.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 4.
190 Id. 26. "In some cases, employers deduct social security payments from workers
but then fail to submit the funds to the Salvadoran Social Security Institute, as required
by law." Id.
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many workers go without health insurance.' 9' This is a serious
problem for pregnant women who need prenatal care.
Under Salvadoran law, employers are obliged to make
monthly deposits with the Salvadoran Social Security Insititute,
consisting of employer dues and contributions deducted from the
worker's pay checks, as a form of insurance.' 92 If employers do
not turn the monies over, or delay in doing so, individual
employees will feel the repercussions. When these payments are
delinquent, the workers and their families are faced with two
choices: either go to a private clinic or hospital if they can afford
it, or receive no medical treatment. 193
When employers fail to comply with the rules, they may suffer
economic repercussions. 194 The problem is that this policy is not
strictly enforced. "Even when the Labor Inspectorate has evidence
of employer failure to comply with social security laws, it may fall
to inform the ISSS or take any steps to remedy the situation."''
95
Another problem women in maquilas in El Salvador face is that
they are denied time off work to go to doctor's visits.196 This, too,
is of particular importance to pregnant women who must go to
doctors periodically for prenatal care, but are blatantly denied
access to health care. In addition, many employees face
repercussions because of their stances against these unfair labor
practices. Sometimes workers who speak out about unfair
practices are fired while others are subsequently blacklisted from
working in other maquilas.' 97  Such practices are not only
191 DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE, supra note 184, at 26.
192 Id. at 27.
193 At this particular maquila "workers also claim that the company failed to pay
required maternity benefits for roughly thirty women." Id. at 49.
194 Id. at 27 ("Employer delay in making social security payments is punishable
with up to [ten] percent surcharge of the total amount due.").
195 Id. at 28.
196 "Confecciones Ninos workers began an organizing drive in March 2001, in
response to ... failure to grant permission for doctors' visits ..... Id. at 37.
197 DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE, supra note 184, at 54.
Not only have workers not received any compensation ... but they claim that
they are unable to find jobs at other factories, as they are reportedly blacklisted.
Several workers [said] workers has also been forced from other maquilas once
management learned of their previous employer. One worker asserted, 'they
don't hire us in other maquilas for fighting for our rights.'
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violations of Salvadoran domestic laws; they are clear violations
of CEDAW, a convention to which El Salvador is a signatory.
Many of the domestic labor laws in El Salvador are not
enforced. Several reasons exist for such a lack of enforcement,
including the desire of the government to cover up-or at least
deny the existence of-some employers' actions and the situation.
These laws are overlooked because of the great economic impact
the maquilas have on the countries in which they operate. In the
eyes of the owners and many governmental officials, their
continued economic viability depends on their ability to exploit
workers in this manner.198
VII.Conclusion
While the ILO has made efforts at achieving equality of
opportunity between women and men in the global workforce, it
has failed in many areas of the world to provide sufficient
protection. Women working in the domestic sector and maquila
industry in some Central American countries are faced with many
of the same kinds of discrimination and treatment. The companies
prioritize their profit margins far higher than they do compliance
with international labor and human rights standards-especially
for women-and have little incentive to change. The failure of the
ILO is due largely to the fact that the organization lacks sufficient
enforcement mechanisms to carry out its mandates. As a result
many countries in the world view the organization as irrelevant.
In order for women in these countries to receive any relief, the
Organization will have to be more diligent about requiring
compliance with its mandates, or its reputation will continue to
decline in the world community. This would result in more wide
ranging forms of discrimination, continued prioritization of profits
over people, and slower progression toward gender equality in the
world workforce.
-E. ABENA ANTWI
198 Nonetheless, such practices are violative of the Right to Organise and Collective
Bargaining Convention of 1949, the Collective Bargaining Convention of 1981, and the
Termination of Employment Convention of 1982.
While El Salvador is not a signatory to these conventions, it is a member nation of
the ILO which triggers required reporting on compliance with ILO conventions. See
ILOLEX: Conventions, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl.htm.
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